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Abstract
This paper exploits yearly accounting data from 1977 to 1994 to
test the relative signaling power of dividends and net stock repurchases.
The specification controls for potential agency cost and asset dissipation
effects.   Specifically, we regress changes in future income before
extraordinary items on changes in dividends, changes in net stock
repurchases, and a host of control variables.  We also split the sample at
1981 to measure the impact of changes in the relative taxation of
distribution methods.  For the full twenty-year sample, only dividend
changes are correlated with changes in future income.  Moreover, the
dividend coefficient and the repurchases coefficient differ statistically
different in every future income equation.  Splitting the sample reveals that
the pre-1981 subsample drives the full-sample results.  Put another way,
the empirical link between changes in dividends and changes in future
income vanishes just as a revision of the tax law reduced the tax
disadvantage of dividend distributions.  This evidence supports the notion
that, at least for a period in time, firms deliberately exposed shareholders to
punitive taxation to signal favorable prospects.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: G35, H323
I. Introduction
In a Miller-Modigliani world, the announcement of cash distributions to
shareholders has no effect on firm value.  In the real world, unanticipated increases in
dividends or share repurchases correlate with jumps in the stock prices of announcing
firms.  Furthermore, although stock repurchases imply a lower tax burden for
shareholders, many firms prefer to distribute cash with dividends.
These stylized facts suggest several puzzles.  First, why does the market reward
cash distributions, even when equity issues accompany such distributions?  Second, why
do firms rely heavily on dividends to distribute cash when repurchases offer a tax-favored
alternative?
The literature offers two explanations for the distribution premium: agency cost
minimization (moral hazard) and signaling (adverse selection).  In the agency cost story,
the market rewards firms for disgorging cash because managers waste free cash flow on
negative net present value projects.  Any device—dividends or repurchases—that strips
firms of free cash and forces them to the capital market for funding enhances share value.
In the signaling story, the market cannot distinguish between firms with good prospects
and firms with poor prospects.  Managers of undervalued firms use dividends or
repurchases to disseminate private information.  In some signaling models, dividends
derive their attractiveness from tax disadvantages or commitment perceptions that make
them more costly signals to mimic than repurchases.  In other models, repurchases provide
a stronger signal than dividends.4
This paper exploits firm-level accounting data to distinguish among signaling
theories for dividends and repurchases.  Unlike other work, we offer a specification that
tests for the relative signaling power of repurchases and dividends while controlling for
other potential explanations of the distribution premium.  Our evidence is important for
two reasons.  First, an implication of the signaling hypothesis—indeed, a necessary
condition—is that expectations of future earnings increases follow unanticipated
distributions.  The evidence presented to date on the link between distributions and future
earnings offers only weak for support the signaling story.  At a general level, our results
supply additional support for the notion that distributions are important as signals rather
than as devices for disciplining management.  Second, because our specification tests the
relative signaling power of dividends and repurchases, our evidence addresses the question
of whether one form of distribution dominates as a signaling device.  Indeed, our findings
suggest that, at least for a period of time, dividends were the stronger signal, thereby,
offering support for the class of models that argues that dividends dominate repurchases as
a vehicle for transmitting private information to the market.
Specifically, we regress changes in future income before extraordinary items on
changes in dividends, changes in net stock repurchases, and a host of control variables.
Including net stock repurchases along with dividends on the right-hand side tests whether
the form of the distribution matters.  Including net stock repurchases also controls for
potential agency cost and asset dissipation effects that may accompany cash distributions
in any form.  Because the sample spans a 1981 change in tax law that reduced the relative
tax disadvantage of dividends, our results offer support for the class of models that rely on
tax arguments to motivate dividend signaling.5
In equations estimated on the full sample (1977-1994), the form of the distribution
matters statistically and economically; increases in current dividends forecast increases in
income before extraordinary items one year and two years in the future.  In contrast,
increases in net stock repurchases do not foreshadow increases in future income.  More
importantly, the dividend and repurchases coefficients differ statistically, implying that
dividends provided a much stronger signal.  Splitting the sample at 1981 reveals that the
full sample results are driven by the pre-1981 subsample.  After 1981, when changes in tax
law significantly reduced the tax disadvantage of dividends, neither changes in dividends
nor repurchases are significantly correlated with changes in future income.  This evidence
supports the notion that firms deliberately expose shareholders to punitive taxation to
signal favorable prospects when the tax differential between distribution methods is
sufficiently large.
II. Related Literature
The modern treatment of dividends began with Miller and Modigliani (1961).  In
perfect capital markets, they reasoned, firm dividend policy has no effect on share value.
In a world with large numbers of buyers and sellers, perfect information, zero transactions
costs, no tax differentials and fully rational agents, investors should care only about a
firm’s future stream of earnings.  Investors should care only about future earnings because
they can privately create an optimal dividend policy.  Because investors can privately
create their own dividend policy, no one will pay a firm a premium for a specific payout
policy.
Modern capital markets, of course, are not perfect.  Hence, modern dividend
research has sought to identify the specific Miller-Modigliani assumption that is key to the6
irrelevance result.  Much effort has focused on the differential treatment of dividends and
capital gains in the tax code.  Specifically, the individual tax code treats dividends more
harshly.  Not only do investors pay a higher tax rate on dividends, capital gains realization
may be deferred until the most auspicious time.  At the limit, investors may bequeath stock
portfolios to heirs without surrendering any portion to the IRS.  The tax consequences of
dividends are so dramatic that, at first glance, it is puzzling that firms choose positive
payouts.
Firms do, however, continue to pay dividends.  In fact, in 1996 U.S. corporations
paid out $218 billion in dividends (BEA 1997).  Even stranger, many firms issued new
equity while, at the same time, exposing their shareholders to punitive dividend taxes.
Frustration over the failure of modern corporate finance to explain aggregate dividend
levels, cross-sectional differences in payouts and the simultaneous existence of positive
payouts and new equity issuance led Fisher Black to coin the term, “The Dividend Puzzle”
(Black 1976).
Tax law does not represent the only departure from the Miller-Modigliani
framework.  Dividend payments may also serve as a partial solution to moral hazard
problems in the firm.  Separation of ownership from control allows managers to
inefficiently deploy resources legally belonging to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling
1976; Jensen and Smith 1985).  To combat waste, shareholders incur costs to monitor
managers, and managers incur bonding costs.  Yet, marginal analysis implies that residual
losses are positive.  Together, monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual losses reduce
firm value relative to the level that would obtain under owner-management.
Easterbrook (1984) and Rozeff (1982) employed agency costs to derive a rationale
for positive dividend payouts.  Commitment to dividends forces a firm to tap capital
markets regularly to fund investment projects.  Periodic review by capital markets, in turn,
keeps managers honest and, thereby, reduces agency costs.  Building on this literature,
Jensen (1986) advanced a “free cash flow” hypothesis under which managers waste all free7
cash flow under their discretion.  In the free cash flow story, dividend payments enhance
share value by preventing managers from wasting money on negative net-present-value
projects.  Dividends, of course, are not unique as a device for stripping free cash flow
from managers or for forcing firms to submit to capital market scrutiny.  Debt or stock
repurchases can also perform these functions.  Although direct evidence on the agency
cost explanation of distributions is sparse, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) have shown that
dividend changes provoke larger stock price responses for overinvesting firms—firms with
Tobin’s Q values less than unity—than for other firms.  Christie and Nanda (1994) have
also shown that firm value increased in response to the undistributed profits tax of 1936
and 1937.
Another line of research on the dividend puzzle pursues the implications of adverse
selection.  In the Miller-Modigliani framework, market participants possess complete
information regarding all the variables important to share valuation.  In the real world,
however, corporate insiders know things that outsiders do not.  Specifically, managers
have knowledge about future earnings that does not appear in financial statements.  This
information gap causes firms with good prospects to trade at a discount from full
information value unless managers can find some way to credibly signal the market.
Riley (1979) outlined conditions under which a signaling equilibrium will occur,
that is, a market equilibrium using signals to partition good and bad quality items.  For
such an equilibrium to exist, the signal must have a cost and a benefit.  To deter false
signaling, the cost/benefit ratio of the signal must also rise with its level.  Later,
Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock (1985) applied this
framework to dividends.  They established that positive payouts carry a cost—dividends
subject recipients to relatively higher taxation or force firms to acquire costly external
finance for new investment—as well as a benefit—firm value rises with the signal.
Moreover, firms with poor prospects cannot afford dividend signals because they lack
future slack in earnings.8
Several recent papers (Bernheim 1991; Bernheim and Wantz 1995; and Bernheim
and Redding 1996) have argued that tax policy makes dividends relatively more attractive
than repurchases as a signaling device.  In these papers, dividends signal future earnings by
“burning cash.”  Shifting from stock repurchases to dividends burns cash because, given
tax disadvantages, dividends represent the most expensive way to distribute funds to
shareholders.  Managers of high-quality firms can burn cash with dividends because they
anticipate healthy future earnings; managers of low-quality firms cannot afford to be so
extravagant.  Burning cash in other ways—by donating to the arts or by embarking on an
expensive advertising campaign—is ineffective because the signals are muddy.  For
example, suppose a firm decides to burn cash by donating to the opera.  The market might
assume that the donation reflects agency behavior (i.e., the chief executive officer is an
opera buff) rather than a signal of future earnings.  Because a shift from stock repurchases
to dividends does not enhance managerial utility or serve any other internal corporate
purpose, managers have no incentive to do it other than to signal future earnings.
A limitation of many signaling models is that firms can use only one distribution
method to signal.  Ofer and Thakor (1987) and Williams (1996), in contrast, allow firms to
signal with a combination of repurchases and dividends.  In the Ofer/Thakor model,
dividends impose costs on the firm by forcing it to tap the capital market for project
funding.  Repurchases impose costs on managers—assuming managers do not
participate—by increasing their relative holdings of firm stock, thereby exposing them to
higher risk.  Managers rely on dividends to signal when the perceived gap between the
intrinsic value of the firm and the market’s valuation is small.  When the firm is seriously
undervalued, managers signal with stock repurchases.  Between the two extremes,
dividends and repurchases may both be used to signal future prospects.  In the Williams
model, agents believe that dividends reflect a level of commitment that stock repurchases
do not.  This perception, in turn, provides incentives for managers to rationally opt to
signal with dividends rather than repurchases.9
An important empirical implication of the signaling hypothesis—indeed, a
necessary condition—is that stock prices move on the news of a share repurchase or
dividend innovation.  Research on capital market responses to share repurchases and
dividend innovations has produced results consistent with signaling.  Share repurchases
correlate with jumps in the stock prices of announcing firms (Dann 1981; Vermaelen,
1981).  Stock prices also vary directly with dividend innovations for announcing firms
(Aharony and Swary 1980; Asquith and Mullins 1983; Brickley 1983; Charest 1978;
Handjinicolaou and Kalay 1984; Healy and Palepu 1988; and Petit 1972).  Finally,
repurchases induce significantly higher average stock price movements than dividend hikes
(Dann 1981; Masulis 1980; Vermaelen 1981).  By itself, however, evidence that stock
prices rise on the news of a surprise share repurchase or dividend is not sufficient to
establish the case for signaling.  Again, the premium could be a reward for removing free
cash flow from managerial discretion or for forcing the firm to submit to capital market
inspection.  Also, the premium for stock repurchases could be explained by temporary
pressures imposed on the market by repurchase activity, particularly if tender offers take
place at prices significantly above the pre-tender level.  In such cases, the premium does
not represent the transmission of favorable information about the company to the market.
An additional necessary condition for the signaling hypothesis is that subsequent
changes in earnings reflect dividend changes or stock repurchases.  Indeed, Allen and
Michaely (1994) note that this condition is crucial for any signaling model.  Though the
evidence on the link between repurchases and earnings is limited, Dann, Masulis, and
Mayers (1991) have shown that positive earnings surprises follow tender offers.  More
evidence exists on dividends and earnings.  Healy and Palepu (1988) demonstrated that
significant changes in earnings follow dividend initiations and omissions.  Ofer and Siegel
(1987) found that analysts revised earnings forecasts following the announcement of an
unanticipated dividend change and that the revision varied positively with the size of the
dividend surprise. Olson and McCann (1994) employed a Granger causality test to show10
that dividend data improved earnings predictions.  Kao and Wu (1994) used a rational
signaling model to show that dividends reflect past, current and future earnings
information.  Finally, Aharony and Dotan (1994) identified a strong link between dividend
changes and future unexpected earnings even when current unexpected earnings also
appeared as an explanatory variable.
Despite the cited papers on dividends and earnings, Allen and Michaely observed
that “the overall accumulated evidence lends only weak support to the assertion that
dividend changes convey information about future changes in earnings” (p. 42).
Furthermore, because none of the cited papers controls for stock repurchases, the
evidence is incapable of distinguishing between the various signaling models.  The result
can also be contaminated by agency and asset dissipation effects.  The loss of future
income resulting from the removal of net assets from the firm to fund the payout—the
asset dissipation effect—is a particular concern since it could mask the presence of
signaling. Similarly, the work on repurchases and earnings fails to control for dividends.
Including both repurchases and dividends in equations forecasting changes in earnings, as
this paper does, controls for potential agency cost or asset dissipation effects and ensures
that a statistical relationship between, say, changes in dividends and changes in earnings
results from signaling.
III.  Data and Model Description
To test the relative signaling power of stock repurchases and dividends, we
examine annual accounting data for firms selected from the COMPUSTAT data base.  Our
sample begins in 1977 and ends in 1994.  (Data for 1976 as well as for 1995 and 1996 are
used for leads and lags.)  The model uses current changes in dividends and net stock
repurchases as well as a host of control variables to predict future changes in earnings.
Specifically, we estimate the following equation using ordinary least squares:11
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where:
DInci,t+n = Change in future income before extraordinary items for
firm i, normalized by total assets.  Specifically, n = 1 and 2
years, i.e. income 1 and 2 years in the future.
DDivi,t = Current change in dividends for firm i, normalized by total
assets.
DRepi,t = Current change in net stock repurchases for firm i,
normalized by total assets.
DInci,t = Current change in income before extraordinary items for
firm i, normalized by total assets.
DLiabi,t = Current change in book value of liabilities for firm i,
normalized by total assets.
Log(assetsi,t) = Natural log of current assets for firm i.
D-SIC = Dummy variable for four-digit SIC code.
D-YEAR  = Dummy variable for year.
et = Idiosyncratic error term.
a, bz = Parameters (z = 1, 2, 3,......7)  to be estimated.
The sample reflects several adjustments to eliminate potential sources of noise.
For example, we exclude financial firms and utilities because regulators play a large role in
setting their dividend policies.  Because a different signaling theory explains the behavior
of firms with negative payouts (Myers and Majluf 1984), we consider only firms for whom
the total of repurchases plus dividends minus stock sales exceed zero.  Finally, to eliminate
other outliers we exclude firms if their ratios of dividends to current assets, net stock
repurchases to current assets, or income before extraordinary items to current assets lay
outside the interval bounded by -0.5 and  0.5.  After adjusting the sample as indicated, the
regressions used between 11,026 and 32,078 observations.  Table one contains summary
statistics for the sample.12
As always, model selection reflects a desire to reduce potential econometric
problems.  First, to correct for heteroskedasticity, we normalize all variables except the
dummy variables and the natural log of assets by assets at the current date, and use
White’s standard errors (1980).  Second, to guard against non-stationarity, we estimate
the model using the first differences of all non-dummy variables except the natural log of
assets.
We select the dependent and control variables to isolate the signaling power of
changes in dividends and repurchases.  Changes in future income before extraordinary
items rather than changes in future net income serve as the dependent variable because
extraordinary items are nonrecurring and, therefore, unforecastable.  Changes in current
income before extraordinary items act as a control variable because we anticipate income
changes to mean revert.  We include the change in liabilities on the right-hand side to
control for the use of debt to control agency problems (Jensen 1986).  The natural log of
assets serves as an additional independent variable to control for firm size.  Finally, we
include year dummies and four-digit SIC code dummies to control for time and industry
effects.
To test the relative signaling power of distribution methods, we include changes in
net stock repurchases and dividends on the right-hand side.  Including all forms of
distributions on the right-hand side controls for potential agency cost and asset dissipation
effects (i.e., reductions in assets available to generate future income).  A dividend
coefficient that is significantly greater than the repurchases coefficient would imply that
dividends signal future income more strongly than repurchases.  Similarly, a repurchases
coefficient that is significantly greater than the dividends coefficient would imply that
repurchases provide the stronger signal of future income.  Since both dividends and
repurchases result in asset dissipation effects, the individual coefficients are biased
downward.  Asset dissipation does not, however, bias the  difference between the
coefficients.13
IV.  Evidence: Full Sample (1977-1994)
Table two contains regression results for the full sample (1977 to 1994).  Column
one displays the regression coefficients for the model with income changes one year ahead
as the dependent variable.  The standard errors appear below the coefficients in
parentheses.  The model explains 21% of the variation in income changes one year in the
future.  The coefficient on changes in current dividends is positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level.  No other coefficient—on stock repurchases or any of the
control variables—is significant.  More importantly, the difference between the dividend
and repurchases coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level.  This evidence is
consistent with the notion that changes in current dividends “signal” changes in income
one year out.  Moreover, the size of the dividend coefficient, which implies that a one
dollar increase in dividends today signals a 42 cent increase in income in one year, is
economically significant as well.
Full sample evidence for the equation with income two years out as the dependent
variable is also consistent with dividend signaling.  Column two four in table two contains
the regression coefficients and accompanying standard errors for this model.  The
regression accounts for 4% of the variation in income changes two years in the future.
Unlike the one year ahead model, some of the control variables are statistically significant
(changes in current income at the 1% level and the natural log of assets at the 10% level).
Again, changes in current dividends are statistically significant at 5% level; changes in net
stock repurchases are not statistically significant in the model.  Again, the difference in the14
two coefficients is statistically significant at the 5% level.  Finally, the dividend coefficient
is economically significant—a $1 increase in dividends today signals a 17 cent increase in
income two years in the future.
V. Evidence: Split Sample
We next split the sample at 1981 to examine the impact of a change in tax law that
materially reduced the relative tax disadvantage of dividend distributions.  Effective
January 1, 1982, the top marginal individual income rate, which applies to dividend
income, dropped from 70% to 50%.  The maximum capital gains tax rate, which applies to
profits on stock repurchases, also dropped but by a much smaller amount (28% to 20%).
If the justification for dividend signaling lies in the relative tax disadvantage, then
dividends would be a less effective signal of future income in the post-1981 environment.
The split sample evidence suggests that the pre-1981 subsample drove the full
sample results.  Table three contains regression equations for income changes one year
and two years ahead for the pre-1981 subsample.  The regression accounts for roughly 7%
of the variation in income changes one year out.  Of the control variables, only the change
in current income is statistically significant (at the 1% level).  Both changes in dividends
and stock repurchases are significant.  The dividend coefficient is positive and significant
at the 1% level; the repurchases coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% level.
More importantly, the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same can be rejected at the
1% level of significance.  The magnitude of the dividends coefficient suggests that a one
dollar increase in current dividends signals a 26 cent increase in income in one year.15
Results for the two year ahead equation appear, as before, in columns four, five
and six.  The model accounts for roughly 9 percent of the variation in income changes two
years out.  Two of the three control variables are statistically significant: changes in
current income (at the 1% level) and the natural log of assets (at the 10% level).  As in the
one-year ahead equation, dividend changes are positive and significant at the 1% level.
The repurchases coefficient, however, does not differ from zero statistically.  Again, the
hypothesis that the dividends and repurchases coefficient are equal can be rejected at the
1% level of significance.  The size of the dividends coefficient implies that a one dollar
increase in dividends today signals a 41 cent increase in income in two years.  Overall, the
pre-1981 evidence is consistent with the full sample evidence.  Dividends provide a
stronger signal of future income than stock repurchases.
Regressions estimated on the 1982 to 1994 subsample, however, tell a different
story.  Results from these regressions appear in table four.  The one-year ahead equation
explains 35% of the variation in income changes, and two of the three control variables are
statistically significant (changes in income at the 1% level and changes in liabilities at the
5% level).  Neither the dividends nor the repurchases coefficient, however, differs from
zero statistically.  More importantly, the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal can not
be rejected.  The two year ahead equation yields similar results.  The adjusted R
2 for the
model is roughly 5%, and one of the control variables—changes in current income—is
significant (at the 1% level).  Again, neither the dividends nor the repurchases coefficient
is statistically significant.  Moreover, the hypothesis of coefficient equality can not be
rejected at conventional levels.  Taken together, the evidence implies that the signaling
power of dividends faded after the tax penalty on dividends declined.  This evidence16
supports the notion that firms deliberately expose shareholders to punitive taxation to
signal favorable prospects when the tax wedge is sufficiently large—consistent with the
Bernheim model.
VI. Discussion
Our evidence is particularly important in light of a recent spate of empirical articles
about the dividend puzzle.  These articles offer evidence both in favor of and against the
adverse selection solution to the dividend puzzle.  DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner
(1992) and Howe, He, and Kao (1992) support the information content interpretation of
dividend policy.  Specifically, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner examined a sample of
167 firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange that also suffered at least one annual
loss between 1980 and 1985.  They concluded that dividend reductions did, indeed, signal
poor earnings prospects.  Howe, He, and Kao, meanwhile, extended Lang and
Litzenberger’s (1989) work on the “free cash flow interpretation of dividend policy by
examining a broader set of transactions, namely share repurchases and special dividends.
Unlike Lang and Litzenberger, they found no difference in excess returns on
announcement between high-Q and low-Q firms.  Moreover, adding a cash flow measure
did not improve the explanatory value of cross-sectional regressions designed to account
for differences in returns.  Howe, He, and Kao interpret their results as evidence against
the moral hazard resolution and in favor of the adverse selection resolution of the dividend
puzzle.
Recent empirical papers have also undermined support for the signaling
interpretation of dividend policy.  Smith and Watts (1992) examine cross-sectional
differences in corporate financing-, dividend-, and compensation-policy choices and
conclude that contracting theories are a more plausible explanation for dividend policy
than signaling theories.  Dhillon and Johnson (1994) extend the Handjinicolaou and Kalay17
(1984) work on the wealth expropriation interpretation of the dividend announcement
effect.  Unlike Handjinicolaou and Kalay, they found that the bond price reaction to a
large dividend change was the opposite of the stock price reaction.  Dhillon and Johnson
interpret this finding as evidence that large dividends transfer wealth from bondholders to
stockholders rather than signal favorable earnings prospects.  Finally, and most
importantly, Amihud and Murgia (1997) investigate the reaction of German equities to
dividend announcements using an event study framework.  They document a stock price
reaction to dividend changes similar to the one observed in American equity markets.
Since German tax policy does not disadvantage dividends, Amihud and Murgia interpret
their result as evidence against the class of tax-based signaling models.
As noted earlier in the paper, our work differs from other empirical signaling
papers because we explicitly control for total distributions, thereby holding agency cost
and asset dissipation effects in abeyance (at least on tests of the difference between
dividend and repurchase coefficients).  Moreover, we explicitly compare the relative
signaling power of repurchases and dividends, establishing at least for our sample, that
dividend changes alone signal changes in future income.  Finally, we show that the relative
signaling power of dividends declined dramatically in the wake of a change in tax policy
that reduced the penalty association with dividend distributions.  Amihud and Murgia are
certainly correct that previous empirical research on payout policy is “U.S. centric” (p.
397), and by documenting a positive reaction to dividends in a country without a dividend
penalty, they make a strong case for agency costs and non-tax signaling explanations of
the dividend puzzle.  Their evidence does not, however, imply that tax-based signaling will
not occur under the appropriate circumstances.18
V. Conclusion
Signaling models suggest that firms use cash distributions to tip the market about
future income prospects.  These models take one of three forms: models in which
dividends are the dominant signaling device, models in which repurchases are the
dominant signaling device, and models in which the two distribution methods are close
substitutes.  We attempt to discriminate among the three classes of models by regressing
future income changes on changes in stock repurchases and dividends as well as a host of
control variables.  We find that, for the 1977-1994 sample period, dividend changes
provide the stronger signal about changes in future income.  Moreover, we split our
sample to examine the impact of a change in tax policy that significantly reduced the tax
disadvantage of dividends.  We find that dividend changes no longer effectively signaled
changes in future income after the reduction in the tax penalty on dividends.  We interpret
the full sample and split sample results as evidence that firms engage in tax-based signaling
when the tax wedge between distribution methods is sufficiently high.  Moreover, we find
no evidence that repurchases effectively signal future income change.  Finally, our
evidence does not allow strong condasset dissipation effects confound our attempt to  on
the right-hand side in an income forecasting equation, our specification allows we ensure
that the strong, statistically significant correlation between current dividends and future
earnings reflects signaling and relates to attributes unique to dividends as a distribution
method.  Our evidence suggests that firms deliberately expose shareholders to excessive
taxation to signal favorable prospects.  Myers (1986) has observed that some combination
of moral hazard and adverse selection probably accounts for corporate dividend policy.
We hope this paper, by offering strong evidence of dividend signaling, has helped resolve
the dividend puzzle in favor of adverse selection.19
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Nonbinary Regression Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dividends
Assets
32078 0.022 0.029 0.000 0.495
Net Stock Repurchases
Assets
32078 0.008 0.033 -0.381 0.496
Income before Extraordinary Items
Assets
32078 0.057 0.064 -0.487 0.497
Liabilities
Assets
32078 0.507 0.180 0.000 1.000
Asset size (in millions of $) 32078 21,125.4 8,295.627 10.006 245,133
The sample reflects several adjustments to eliminate potential sources of noise.  We exclude
financial firms and utilities because regulators play a large role in setting their dividend
policies.  Because a different signaling theory explains the behavior of firms with negative
payouts, we consider only firms for whom the total of repurchases plus dividends minus stock
sales exceed zero.  Finally, to eliminate other outliers we exclude firms if their ratios of
dividends to current assets, net stock repurchases to current assets, or income before
extraordinary items to current assets lay outside the interval bounded by -0.5 and 0.5.  Of the
32,078 observations, 4,490 represent net stock repurchases with no dividends; 10,761
represent dividend payments with a net sale of stock; 8,370 represent dividend payments with
no net repurchase or sale; and 8,457 represent dividend payments with net repurchases of
stock.24
TABLE TWO
Relative Signaling Power of Dividends and Net Stock Repurchases






5[Log(assetsi,t)] + b6 (D-SIC) + b
7(D-YEAR) + et
Full Sample:  1977-1994
This table shows the relative signaling power of changes in net repurchases and dividends for
the entire sample.  Formally, the model regresses changes in income before extraordinary items
one year and two years in the future on changes in current dividends, changes in current net
stock repurchases and a host of control variables.  In both the one year ahead model and the
two year ahead model, the dividend coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5%
level.  More importantly, the dividend coefficient is statistically different from the repurchases
coefficient, also at the 5% level.  This evidence suggests that dividends provided the stronger
signal about future income changes for the sample period.
Dependent Variable
Change in Future Income Change in Future Income
One Year Ahead Two Years Ahead
DInci,t+1 DInci,t+2
Independent Variable (1) (2)
Change in current dividends 0.423 ** 0.168 **
DDivi,t (0.210) (0.067)
Change in current net repurchases 0.016 0.017
DRepi,t (0.020) (0.021)
Change in current income 0.002 -0.114 ***
DInci,t (0.065) (0.033)
Change in current liabilities -0.090 0.001
DLiabi,t (0.060) (0.013)





H0: DDivi,t = DRepi,t F(1;31,680) = 4.24** F(1;31,680) = 4.72**
To correct for heteroskedasticity, we use White’s standard errors and normalize changes in
dividends, repurchases, income, and liabilities by assets at the current date.  To guard against
non-stationarity, we estimate the model using first differences of all non-dummy variables
except the natural log of assets. OLS Regressions include year dummies and 4-digit SIC code
dummies.  Standard errors appear in parentheses below regression coefficients.  Three asterisks
(***) denote statistical significance at the 1% level.  Two asterisks (**) denote statistical
significance at the 5% level.  One asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.25
TABLE THREE
Relative Signaling Power of Dividends and Net Stock Repurchases
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Split Sample:  1977-1981
This table shows the relative signaling power of changes in net repurchases and dividends for
the pre-1981 subsample.  Formally, the model regresses changes in income before
extraordinary items one year and two years in the future on changes in current dividends,
changes in current net stock repurchases and a host of control variables.  In both the one year
ahead model and the two year ahead model, the dividend coefficient is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level.  More importantly, the dividend coefficient is statistically different
from the repurchases coefficient at the 1% level.  This evidence suggests that dividends
provided the stronger signal about future income changes for this sample period.
Dependent Variable
Change in Future Income Change in Future Income
One Year Ahead Two Years Ahead
DInci,t+1 DInci,t+2
Independent Variable (1) (2)
Change in current dividends 0.260 *** 0.414 ***
DDivi,t (0.053) (0.061)
Change in current net repurchases -0.028 ** -0.037
DRepi,t (0.013) (0.026)
Change in current income -0.142 *** -0.244 ***
DInci,t (0.026) (0.032)
Change in current liabilities 0.001 0.005
DLiabi,t (0.006) (0.007)





H0: DDivi,t = DRepi,t F(1;10,659) = 29.03*** F(1;10,659) = 48.20***
To correct for heteroskedasticity, we use White’s standard errors and normalize changes in
dividends, repurchases, income, and liabilities by assets at the current date.  To guard against
non-stationarity, we estimate the model using first differences of all non-dummy variables
except the natural log of assets. OLS Regressions include year dummies and 4-digit SIC code
dummies.  Standard errors appear in parentheses below regression coefficients.  Three asterisks
(***) denote statistical significance at the 1% level.  Two asterisks (**) denote statistical
significance at the 5% level.  One asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.26
TABLE FOUR
Relative Signaling Power of Dividends and Net Stock Repurchases
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Split Sample:  1982-1994
This table shows the relative signaling power of changes in net repurchases and dividends for the post-1981
subsample.  Formally, the model regresses changes in income before extraordinary items one year and two
years in the future on changes in current dividends, changes in current net stock repurchases and a host of
control variables.  In both the one year ahead model and the two year ahead model, neither the dividend
coefficient nor the repurchases coefficient differs statistically from zero.  Moreover, the difference between
the dividend and repurchases coefficient is not statistically significant.  Finally, the change in the magnitude
of the dividends coefficient between the 1977-1981 and 1982-1994 samples is significant at the 1% level in
both future income models.  This evidence suggests that the 1981 reduction in the relative tax penalty on
dividends eliminated the signaling properties of dividends.
Dependent Variable
Change in Future Income Change in Future Income
One Year Ahead Two Years Ahead
DInci,t+1 DInci,t+2
Independent Variable (1) (2)
Change in current dividends -0.160 -0.022
DDivi,t (0.105) (0.040)
Change in current net repurchases 0.013 0.023
DRepi,t (0.017) (0.023)
Change in current income -0.184 *** -0.163 ***
DInci,t (0.071) (0.056)
Change in current liabilities -0.097 ** -0.002
DLiabi,t (0.048) (0.011)





H0: DDivi,t = DRepi,t F(1;20,664) = 2.21 F(1;20,664) = 0.93
H0: DDivi,t (pre-1981)= DDivi,t (post-1981) t(32,076) = 3.583*** t(32,076) = 5.978***
H0: DRepi,t (pre-1981)= DRepi,t (post-1981) t(32,076) = 1.860** t(32,076) = 1.755**
To correct for heteroskedasticity, we use White’s standard errors and normalize changes in dividends,
repurchases, income, and liabilities by assets at the current date.  To guard against non-stationarity, we
estimate the model using first differences of all non-dummy variables except the natural log of assets. OLS
Regressions include year dummies and 4-digit SIC code dummies.  Standard errors appear in parentheses
below regression coefficients.  Three asterisks (***) denote statistical significance at the 1% level.  Two
asterisks (**) denote statistical significance at the 5% level.  One asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance
at the 10% level.